Tactical or strategic reversal?

The head of the Muslim Brotherhood and a group of Islamist leaders met yesterday with Prime Minister Marouf al Bakhit, the head for the General Intelligence Department and other government officials.

After what seems to have been a “frank discussion”, the MB issued a statement pretty much telling everybody what they want to hear. The seven point communiqué included pledges to respect the constitution, laws and principles of democracy and plurality, a pledge to place Jordan’s national interests above all others (apparently refusing to mention the relationship to Hamas directly), a pledge of loyalty to God, country and king, a condemnation of all forms of terrorism, rejection of apostatizing (takfir), a pledge to restrict issuing fatwas (religious edicts) to qualified individuals, and a clear rejection of any statements injurious to the victims of the Amman terror attacks, which was seen as a implicit apology for Mohammad Abu Fares’ famous statements. The statement ends with the hope that the government will close the “hanging issues”.

Elaph has characterized the statement as a “harsh defeat” for the Islamists, citing the continued detention of three of the four deputies and government pledges to try them as well as the formation of a government appointed committee to run the Islamic Center Charity Society. Other press reports are more tempered. Al Ghad reports that the relationship between the Islamist movement and Hamas was raised strongly during the meeting, and report that Islamists attending the meeting describing it as “a responsible national meeting”.

The issue of the hanging issues is also noteworthy. Presumably they are referring to the ICCS and the jailed deputies. This is surprising, since the MB actually welcomed referring the issue to the courts, although they were unhappy with dissolving the administrative committee of the society. Today, Ibrahim Gharaibeh goes so far as to say that the MB has little to do with the society, and that the administration has been hijacked by a clique that refuses outsiders. He even claims that the MB only managed to get Saadedin Zumaili elected chair of the administrative committee, but failed to elect other committee members sympathetic to his reform attempts. Given this signal, it is not obvious what the MB wants. They either control the society and want to retain that control (accepting responsibility for the corruption), or they don’t control it and thus should not complain if the government has retained control. Gharaibeh’s article is at once enlightening and confusing.

As for the deputies, I would find it hard to see the government retrieving the case from the court system. I guess they don’t like article 150 after all.

Anyway, this is certainly a reversal. It is not obvious if the entire Islamist movement is on board. The head of the MB, Salem Falahat, attended the meeting, but the head of the IAF, Zaki Bani Irshaid, did not. The problem with the Islamists is really not their official public statements as much as the sincerity of these statements, and contradicions between the official and unofficial statements. A particularly weak point in their organization is a severe lack of internal discipline, and the constant sending of mixed messages. While the statement is a good step, many people will remain skeptical until their actions start matching their words.