A giant step back

Back in the old days (pre 1989), political parties were banned and leftists and nationalist activists were jailed and prevented from employment. Free to organize and act were the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who colluded with the state to make it look like we had some semblance of pluralism. Since 1999, when the Hamas leadership was expelled from Jordan, and more since 2005, in the aftermath of the hotel bombings, there has been a weakened relationship between the Islamists and the state.

But it looks like we are seeing a change. The Islamists and the government are playing footsie again, with the head of the Mukhabarat (mullah Nader's brother) meeting with both the heads of the IAF and Hamas. Islamists can't hide their glee at getting in the good graces of the government again.

So, now the government is free to arrest and persecute leftist activists again. They recently arrested Saleh Abu Tawileh in Ma'an, demanding that he desist from "political criticism".

Or as Yoggi Berra said, what we have is "Déjà vu all over again".

The IAF slate

After weeks of speculation, the IAF yesterday announced it's list of candidates for the upcoming election. It seems that the MB actually had the final word in naming the candidates, choosing 22 to run in 18 districts. The slate is dominated by the moderate wing of the party, including old timers such as Abdullatif Arabiyat (Salt) and Hamzeh Mansour (Amman second). Most analyses see the modest number of contestants and their moderate nature as a message to the state: the moderates are in control and they don't want to be perceived as a threat. A more reasonable analysis by Jamil Nimri is that this number of candidates has a better chance of winning. Some reports have suggested that the prime minister challenged the moderated during a recent meeting by dismissing their clout in the party. This challenge seems to have had an effect.

The head of the IAF, Zaki Bani Irshaid is not happy about this. He is perceived to be a hawk and has been sidelined in the selection processes. He was even hoping to run himself, but was rebuffed. Bani Irshaid was not in attendance when the IAF slate was announced. There are reports that hawks in the party are planning to work towards the failure of some of the more moderate candidates on the slate.

So, while the moderates have won the latest round, there seems to be more of a struggle on the way.

Professional wrestling, anyone?

Political savvy, IAF style

Yesterday hundreds of people from the town of Mleih, south of Madaba, staged a protest against rising prices, corruption and falling standards of living. It is interesting to note that reports on this do not indicate the involvement of any political party in the organization or staging of this protest. Of course, this is typical.

So, what is the head of Jordan’s largest political party involved with these days? Well, he is busy halfheartedly denying saying that “those who live in […] marginalized regions are, with all due respect, people that are less knowledgeable and less educated, culturally and politically, thus they should not be the majority in the parliament”. This statement has infuriated many Jordanians, largely because this is not true. Apparently, Bani Irshaid believes that only less knowledgeable people would refrain from voting for his backward looking party. His denial is mostly an attack on Al Rai, which reported the original interview published by Jordan Business in English. Why not attack Jordan Business? Because Al Rai is an easier target and because they probably realize that Jordan Business has a recording of the interview. In a pathetic play of words, he denies insulting Bedouins, which is true. He insulted people who live in marginalized areas.

But my question is simple. Who has more political acumen? People peacefully demonstrating for better living conditions in rural areas or politicians who turn their back on the needs of such people and accuse them of backwardness?

Nice try, but it won't work

It is widely recognized that the base of the Islamist movement in Jordan is strongly rooted with Jordanians with Palestinian origins. Thus, much of the defense of Hamas last year when the arms smuggling case broke came from this perspective. Many people, even who don’t identify with the Islamists, viewed Hamas as a legitimate resistance organization that had not been tainted with Arab or Palestinian blood. Recent events in Gaza changed this myth for most.

So, in an interesting turn of events, the head of Hamas, Khaled Mish’al has met with Nahid Hattar. In their meeting, Mish’al told Hattar what he wanted to hear: Hamas loves Jordan, and is grateful for King Hussein saving his life; Hamas can become a gateway for Jordanian influence in Palestine; the peace process is at dead end and the liquidation of the Palestinian cause is a grave threat to Jordan; and hardships imposed by Israel on the Palestinians will lead to mass displacement from the occupied territories towards Jordan. He also admitted involvement in the smuggling of weapons to Jordan, but said that they were only destined to be transported to the West Bank (yeah, right).

Hattar, like many East Bank Jordanians, worries about changing the character of the state in a way that decreases the influence of traditional power structures that purport to defend East Bank Jordanian interests. So, playing on this, Misha’al told him that he is totally against the calls for increasing Palestinian Jordanian political representation, as Adnan Abu Odeh continues to do.

Now, Mish’al continues to hold a Jordanian passport. Moreover, Hamas and Jordanian Islamists still call the 1988 disengagement unconstitutional, and demand its revocation. So, basically, Mish’al has sold off his Palestinian Jordanian constituency, with all their demands, in favor of trying to appease and woo East Bankers for their support. I suppose this started with Hamas’ demand to break organizational links with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. However, the depth of cynicism and political opportunism has never been more on display. Machiavelli would be proud.

Another example of IAF duplicity (as if more evidence was needed)

Last week, Al Rai published a little article saying that IAF secretary general, Zaki Bani Irshaid, met with staff of the National Democratic Institute. He reportedly asked them to help the IAF in the upcoming elections through training courses. He also asked the NDI staff to keep the meeting secret “for fear of affecting the party’s image”

The IAF reacted furiously, issuing a statement attacking the article, calling it “a method by their opponents for abandoning rational national debate and sinking it to low and sleazy levels”. They also suggested that the government is spying on them. They implied that the meeting was to explain the IAF rejection of unjust American policy. No mention of helping with the elections. Later, Bani Irshaid claimed that the meeting was kept secret at a request by the NDI. He also said, as in the statement, that the IAF has no problem with meeting non-governmental groups.

Now, this would carry some credibility if not for the fact that the Islamists are constantly attacking other people who cooperate with non governmental organizations. One commentator on Ammon referred to this article published in the IAF mouthpiece, Al Sabeel. In it, the NDI specifically is attacked, with the newspaper claiming that it has links with the CIA and that it is a tool of US foreign policy.

Pathetic.

Shooting the messenger

A recent opinion poll (summary here) by the Jordan Social Research Center has been the focus of some debate. The Islamists made hay over it because it showed that people for the most part would not like to see them getting in power. So, they shoot the messenger.

Of course, the results are similar to previous polls conducted by the center, and are not too different from those conducted by the rival Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan. They are not different from actual results from elections, either, or from my own unscientific empirical observations. But as they say: “denial is not a river in Egypt”.

So, the heretical results of the new poll show that only 17% of people want to vote for the IAF in the next elections. These results also show that most people are happy with the one vote election law, and given the choice, would only use one of their votes. This is what is really angering to the Islamists and their leftist and Arabist allies.

In 1989, the Islamists won 22 out of 80 seats available in the parliament at the time. Newly reintroduced elections, general disenchantment with the economy at the time, the fact that the Islamists were the only legal political organization for the previous 30 years helped them in achieving this result. However, the multiple vote law used at the time helped immensely in magnifying their voting effectiveness. While voters voting for independents wasted their votes by distributing them among a large pool of candidates, the Islamists voted exclusively for the MB ticket.

Realizing the ability of the Islamists to abuse the system, the 1993 elections were conducted based on the one-vote law. While the Islamists were unhappy, they went along. In 1997, they boycotted the elections in protest over the one vote issue. In 2003, they ran and won 17 of the 115 contested seats.

The poll results anger the Islamists because, 18 years after winning 27.5% of seats in the parliament through abusing the voting system, they think that they are the only qualified representative of the Jordanian people, and they feel that any system that denies them their inalienable right to be the custodians of the Jordanian people is undemocratic.

In reality, people support the one vote law for precisely this reason. They don’t want the Islamists to gain power. But maybe if they talk about normalization some more, people will change their mind.

Sell outs

Remember when the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood stuck up for Hamas? They accused the Jordanian government of falsifying the weapons case, and earned the anger and scorn of said government. One would think that gratitude for such loyalty would be in order, no?

Well, Hamas has sent a letter to the MB, saying that they don’t want to be affiliated with them any more. This Dear John letter is somewhat puzzling, since both Hamas and the MB have always denied any organizational links between the two movements. I guess that the whole world misunderstood them. Here, Salem Falahat, Head of the MB says that “So there is a difference; Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist movement that has its special duties, while the Brotherhood in Jordan, as in Egypt and other countries, are independent movements. There is no organizational overlap at all. Hamas is not part of the Brotherhood; it is an independent organization with its own leadership, by-laws, and special councils”. Oh well, I guess that confusion is the result of an honest mistake.

So, the MB met to discuss the request for separation from Hamas, and decided to refuse. Rana Sabbagh has been following this story. Here, she reports that the impasse between the MB and Hamas has been referred to the world head of the MB in Cairo by Khaled Meshaal. The Cairo decision is pending.

Anyway, the hawkish Meshaal seems to be at odds with the hawkish members of the MB, who were the ones who refused to agree to the breakage of the linkages. Meshaal’s move seems to be more related to internal Hamas politics rather than any grand political principle. He is trying to out maneuver the internal Hamas leadership in Palestine by achivening legitimacy through the Palestine National Council. Jordanian officials are worried that Hamas will try to organize itself as an alternative to the MB in the refugee camps. Remember this? On the other hand, the question of recognition of the 1988 severance between the West Bank and Jordan seems to have been resolved.

Both the internal and external Hamas factions are getting in line trying to make amends to the Jordanian government. Ismail Hanieh is scheduled to come to Jordan next week with Mahmoud Abbas, on their way to the Arab summit in Saudi Arabia. Meshaal has also stated that he is eager to resume a good relationship with Jordan. In fact, one of the biggest sticking points between Hamas and Jordan has been the interference of the Palestinian organization in Jordanian politics, specifically the MB.

So, after everybody kisses and makes up, the MB will get the short end of the stick. Where is my Kleenex?

Seeing the light

Yasser Abu Hillaleh, the often harangued Al Jazeerah reporter and Al Ghad Islamist-leaning columnist, is shocked, SHOCKED, at the behavior of IAF deputies in the parliament. He was expecting them to side with freedom of the press, and to vote against the jailing of journalists in “press cases”. Poor fellow. Wait until he hears that Santa Claus is not real.

Honestly, where did he get the idea that Islamists supported free expression? Of course, they often call for the right to free expression, but that is only when they are referring to their own right to express themselves, and not other people.

I am glad that Abu Hillaleh has the honesty to criticize the IAF in this case, instead of the usual apologies. I am always glad when people see the IAF for what it is.

I’m confused

During the height of the Hamas terror cells debate, the Islamists accused the government of fabricating the whole case. The government rounded up a number of suspects and televised the confessions of three of them.

Later, the IAF legal committee (including deputy Zuhair Abu Ragheb) announced that they would represent the accused, and specifically disavowed the three who confessed on television. The IAF said at the time that the three were not members of the Islamist movement, and that they cooperated with the government to fabricate this case.

Last month, on order from the king, the detainees were released, with the exception of the three who testified on TV. Their case was sent to court and they are now on trial.

Now, the funny part is that IAF deputy Abu Ragheb has agreed to defend two of these suspects. Did he forget that the IAF legal committee decided NOT to defend them, because they were tools of the government?

I’m so confused.

PR gone wrong

The IAF has been trying to give the impression that the relatives of the victims of the Amman terror attacks have forgiven it's (ex?) deputies for calling Zarqawi a “martyr”. Their web site features a story of an iftar banquet. The headline states “The relatives of the Amman bombing victims honor deputies Abu Faris and Abu Sukkar”. The story goes on to explain the businessman Thaher Amro held a banquet in honor of the (ex?) deputies, which was attended by “a number” of the victims’ families. The story is dated October 19.

The same day, Ammon news agency carried a similar story. Apparantly, Al Arab Al Yawm carried the same story yesterday, which prompted Thaher Amro to send the newspaper a letter explaining the invitation. According to Amro, there was only one relative of the victims who was invited because he is Amro’s cousin. The invitation was not made in the names of the victims’ families, and only the cousin happened to be one of them. Amro praised the Islamists charity and social work, but disavowed their political practices. He also pointed out that were it not for the king’s pardon, the invitation could not have taken place.

Ouch!

The MB on Russia’s terror list

The Russian government has issued a new list of terrorist organizations. The list includes the Muslim Brotherhood, which has caused some consternation in Jordan, because of the prominent status of the movement in the country.

The list is different from the US issued list because it not only includes the MB, but because it does not include Hamas or Hezbollah. Published reports on the issue suggest that the Russians are only interested in movements that are involved the separatist movements in the Caucuses. The movement makes no secret about its support for Chechen separatists. The criteria used by the Russian authorities to compile the list include any organization that has ties to militant or extremist groups operating in Russia's North Caucasus. This is probably why the MB is on the list.

The parliament issued a statement asking the Russian government to take the Muslim Brotherhood off of the list, saying that “the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is a respectable charitable organization that has nothing to do with terrorism, and is part of the national fabric of Jordan.” The head of the MB in Jordan, Salem Falahat, said the decision was “incomprehensible and illogical.” He also said that the MB is a peaceful organization. He suggested that the decision might be to curry favor with the US, despite the fact that the MB is not considered by the Americans to be a terrorist organization. Falahat reiterated the support of the MB for the separatist movements in Chechnia.

The Jordanian government went on to issue a statement pretty much reflecting the content of the parliament statement, with special emphasis on the “Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood”, to separate it from the international MB movement.

But the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is a part of the international MB, and thus disassociating them from each other is not simply a matter of issuing a statement by the Jordanian government. The Jordanian MB has not disavowed itself from the international movement or its stands on the Chechen issue. This makes for an awkward diplomatic situation, and hopefully the Russians will let the issue slide and not push it. I am not aware of evidence that Jordanian MB members are active in the Chechen insurgency, although Jordanians have been reported to have been killed fighting the Russians. These have been individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda and other such organizations, and not with the MB (I might be wrong here).

The episode raises important issues, however. First, Jordanian foreign policy should be set by the Jordanian government, and not the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. While it is the right of any Jordanian to try to influence the policy of the government through legal and legitimate means, the government should not be put in a position where it is defending a position that it did not take. Second, the Jordanian government is expending political capital defending the Islamist movement. It would be courteous for the Islamists to at least say that they have no business in Russian affairs, rather than continuing their previous stance. Third, it should be noted that the position of the MB on this issue is not based on the national interests of Jordan. It is based on the Pan Islamist tendencies of the movement. Remember that the MB promised to place Jordan’s interests above all others? It was not that long ago.

Will the IAF MP’s resign?

The Islamist movement is studying how to respond to the convictions of Mohammad Abu Fares and Ali Abu Sukkar, who were convicted of inciting sectarianism by declaring Abu Mussab Zarqawi a martyr on pan-Arab satellite television. The movement had hoped that a statement reaffirming their moderation and loyalty to the state would be enough for the government to somehow make the case disappear from the court system. Now, there are obvious splits over the statement and over how to respond to the issuance of the final verdict by the appeals court. Al Arab Al Yawm promised a “surprise statement” by the IAF during the opening of the new parliament session. This did not materialize, suggesting that things are still being discussed (somebody spoke too soon).

From a constitutional perspective, the two deputies will lose their seats in parliament. Paragraph i of article 75 of the constitution says in part that no person shall become a deputy if they have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding one year for a non-political offence and has not been pardoned. Paragraph ii of the same article states that “Should any Senator or Deputy become disqualified during his term of office or should it appear after his election that he lacks one or more of the qualifications provided for in the preceding paragraph, his membership shall, by a resolution of two-thirds of the members of the House to which he belongs, be considered nonexistent and vacant, provided that such a resolution, if passed by the Senate, is submitted to the King for ratification”.

Supporters of the deputies will try to argue that the sentence is a political one, and thus article 75 does not apply. However, since the deputies were convicted under article 150 of the penal code, it does not seem that this argument will stick.

This means that the remaining step will be for the parliament to expel the MP’s. However, since this issue has not been listed in the royal decree calling for a special session of parliament, then to discuss this issue would be unconstitutional until parliament convenes for a regular session. This will leave the issue of membership of the deputies and filling their seats until the beginning of October, when the regular session is scheduled to begin.

There are two camps in the Islamist movement discussing their response. The leadership is interested in dropping the issue and moving on. They probably hope that the seats will be filled by internal elections in the parliament rather than through by-elections. Shihan suggested that there is a deal to this effect whereby the two vacant seats will be filled by moderate IAF members. This would be done under article 88 of the constitution, which does not really fit the situation.

The more radical elements in the party are demanding the resignation of all 17 IAF members from the parliament, as a protest against government “targeting” of the movement. It is also likely that a boycott at this stage will translate into a boycott of next year’s legislative elections.

The IAF boycotted the elections of 1997, and remained marginalized as a result until the 2003 elections. In historical terms, this boycott did little to enhance their standing, and is probably considered to have been a mistake. The leadership has been dragging its feet on making a decision, first waiting for the state security court decision, then waiting for the appellate court decision, and now still waiting, apparently for tempers to cool. The question is whether they will.

Statement fallout

The communiqué issued following the meeting between the leadership of the Islamist movement and the prime minister seems to be causing tension in the movement. As I speculated in my post on the subject at the time, the content of the statement doesn’t seem to elicit a ringing endorsement in the Muslim Brotherhood. Press reports suggest that up to 18 of the 40 members of the MB consultative committee are intending to resign in protest over the statement.

The reason for the turmoil stems from what the protesters call capitulation of the leadership of the party with no commitment by the government to close unresolved issues of the jailed deputies and the ICCS. The state security court has announced that the three remaining jailed deputies will go on trial next Sunday. They have been moved from the remote Al Jafr prison to Qafqafa in the north, which is much more accessible. The main defendant, Mohammed Abu Fares, who is 77 years old, seems to be in poor health. He underwent heart catheterization yesterday, and was subsequently deemed healthy enough to go back to jail with his two colleagues. The ICCS has been entrusted to a temporary administrative committee until the prosecutor general decides whether to send the case to court or not.

So, the government has not changed it’s posture on the deputies and the ICCS. But I am interested in what has been called capitulation. Which of the seven points in the statement would be deemed to be controversial or would be considered backing down? Loyalty to the country? Placing Jordan’s interests first? Rejecting terrorism? Which exactly seems to require soul searching to be agreed to? Also, is the anger caused by the fact that the government has not changed it’s position, because not all of the members of the consultative committee were consulted or simply rejection of the content of the statement?

Some writers are wringing their hands over the possibility of a major split in the Islamist movement. Fahd Khitan is worried that such a spit could mean moving the more extreme elements of the movement into an even more radical direction. I would argue the opposite. By insisting that radicals such as Mohammad Abu Fares being considered within the mainstream, the establishment gives legitimacy to his views. This legitimacy allows for the propagation of extremism and even the mainstreaming of radicalism. Why would that be useful? In the final analysis, it is the Islamist movement that should make the decision as to whether they represent moderation or radicalism. The old game of putting a moderate veneer on a radical substance has been exposed.

But really, what do the radical elements of the MB really object to in the statement?

Tactical or strategic reversal?

The head of the Muslim Brotherhood and a group of Islamist leaders met yesterday with Prime Minister Marouf al Bakhit, the head for the General Intelligence Department and other government officials.

After what seems to have been a “frank discussion”, the MB issued a statement pretty much telling everybody what they want to hear. The seven point communiqué included pledges to respect the constitution, laws and principles of democracy and plurality, a pledge to place Jordan’s national interests above all others (apparently refusing to mention the relationship to Hamas directly), a pledge of loyalty to God, country and king, a condemnation of all forms of terrorism, rejection of apostatizing (takfir), a pledge to restrict issuing fatwas (religious edicts) to qualified individuals, and a clear rejection of any statements injurious to the victims of the Amman terror attacks, which was seen as a implicit apology for Mohammad Abu Fares’ famous statements. The statement ends with the hope that the government will close the “hanging issues”.

Elaph has characterized the statement as a “harsh defeat” for the Islamists, citing the continued detention of three of the four deputies and government pledges to try them as well as the formation of a government appointed committee to run the Islamic Center Charity Society. Other press reports are more tempered. Al Ghad reports that the relationship between the Islamist movement and Hamas was raised strongly during the meeting, and report that Islamists attending the meeting describing it as “a responsible national meeting”.

The issue of the hanging issues is also noteworthy. Presumably they are referring to the ICCS and the jailed deputies. This is surprising, since the MB actually welcomed referring the issue to the courts, although they were unhappy with dissolving the administrative committee of the society. Today, Ibrahim Gharaibeh goes so far as to say that the MB has little to do with the society, and that the administration has been hijacked by a clique that refuses outsiders. He even claims that the MB only managed to get Saadedin Zumaili elected chair of the administrative committee, but failed to elect other committee members sympathetic to his reform attempts. Given this signal, it is not obvious what the MB wants. They either control the society and want to retain that control (accepting responsibility for the corruption), or they don’t control it and thus should not complain if the government has retained control. Gharaibeh’s article is at once enlightening and confusing.

As for the deputies, I would find it hard to see the government retrieving the case from the court system. I guess they don’t like article 150 after all.

Anyway, this is certainly a reversal. It is not obvious if the entire Islamist movement is on board. The head of the MB, Salem Falahat, attended the meeting, but the head of the IAF, Zaki Bani Irshaid, did not. The problem with the Islamists is really not their official public statements as much as the sincerity of these statements, and contradicions between the official and unofficial statements. A particularly weak point in their organization is a severe lack of internal discipline, and the constant sending of mixed messages. While the statement is a good step, many people will remain skeptical until their actions start matching their words.

The battle against extremism

Ever since the infamous actions and statements by parliament members representing the Islamic Action Front in the Jordanian parliament, and their subsequent detention in Al Jafer, it has become clear that the Islamist movement in Jordan is facing monumental decisions regarding it's loyalty to the country and it's stands on democracy and terrorism. For once, tough questions are being asked and answers are being demanded. The answers that should come out should be definitive and clear of the typical vacillations.

King Abdullah has made it clear during his recent CNN interview that his aim is to achieve zero tolerance or acceptance for terrorism. The Jordanian press is on message, with many opinion writers expounding on the issue, as are many bloggers. The real question is how is the Islamist movement dealing with the challenge it is facing from the government and from the public?

On the surface, the IAF is presenting a united stand. Their spokesman, Rhail Ghraibeh, told the Financial Times that the movement will not respond to government "threats", and will try to change the subject. However, hard questions seem to be simmering in the movement.

For example, Ibrahim Gharaibeh wrote in Al Ghad (and posted on his blog) an article calling for the movement to expunge those he calls "Those who espouse extremism and exhibitionist political behavior and contradict themselves as well as contradict the Muslim Brotherhood, and use fatwas for the sake of political or organizational or personal gain". He also alludes to allegations that members of the extremist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood have been implicated in corruption and financial and administrative impropriates related to their control of the "Islamic Center Charitable Society", which is an important financial and social base for the movement. The ICCS runs schools, hospitals, and distributes financial help to the poor.

Comments on the blog post include a group which is particularly enlightening. An "observer" claims that the article is in retaliation for being kicked out of the Muslim Brotherhood during the crisis when Hamas leaders were expelled from Jordan in 1999. I guess revenge is best served cold, if you believe this reasoning. The "observer" also claims that the article seems to be in defense of the moderate wing represented by Rhail Gharabeh, who is Ibrahim's brother (I didn't know that). According to the observer, the article is an invitation for splitting the MB. It seems that this debate is part of what is going on within the movement.

The head of the MB, Salem Falahat, gave an interview to the Al Hayat newspaper. He defended the visit by the MP's to Zarqawi's family, and declined to comment on whether Zarqawi was a martyr or not (the usual vacillation). Falahat also said that Abu Fares' statement that Zarqawi was a martyr represents his own view, and not of the Islamist movement. He also said that Zarqawi committed "terrorist acts", saying that this statement will have a political cost.

So, how much political cost is the Islamist movement willing to pay to stand up for the values all civilized people should support? My guess, not much more, but only time will tell.

Article 150

Although I am immensely happy that our four terror sympathizers are due to spend a couple of weeks in Al Jafer, I think it is important to give due consideration to the objections raised as to the propriety of legal action to suppress free expression, especially by politicians.

I am intrigued by the use of article 150 of the penal code for this purpose. This article, as translated by yours truly, states:

"Any writing, speech or work which is intended or has the effect inciting sectarian or racial strife or encourages conflict between communities and various elements of the nation will be punished for a period of no less than six months and up to three years and with a fine not exceeding 500 JD".

It is noteworthy that this is the same article that journalists are afraid of, as it has been used against them on numerous occasions. Much of the fear from this article stems from the loose phraseology, and the ability to interpret terms such as "inciting" or "encouraging" loosely.

For example, in 2003, three journalists from the Al Hilal weekly newspaper were convicted under this article, after they published a feature entitled "Aisha in the Prophet’s home". The IAF had mounted a campaign against them, issuing a fatwa declaring them apostates. The IAF was satisfied with this sentence, suggesting that they are not against article 150 in principle. More recently, Rhail Gharaibeh, the spokesman for the IAF, declared that the party is all for free speech, as long as it didn't violate a long list of prohibitions, beginning with "not offending anybody". This is quite in line with their tacit approval of article 150.

Calling a terrorist who was responsible for killing thousands of innocent civilians a martyr can be easily construed as both justifying his actions and thus encouraging others to emulate his behavior. Thus it logically fits into the definition of incitement in ways that are more evident than when they were used in the past.

So, the question is whether the IAF parliamentarians are above a law that they themselves condone and have approved of in the past. Despite all the political arguments, I would say that not enforcing the law sends a terrible message. The case should be decided by the courts, not politicians.

I told you so

It is heartening to see outrage stemming from the blatant sympathy shown by IAF members of parliament in the wake of the death of Abu Musa'ab Zarqawi. However, with this outrage comes some level of amusement, which stems from what seems to be great surprise on behalf of the enraged.

Now, I really don't see why people are so surprised by such behavior. Ever since the terror attacks Amman last November, I have been pointing out, to the point of tedium, the discrepancy between the moderate veneer that the Islamists put forth and the reality of their behavior and attitudes. All the indications have been there to see for whoever cared to examine the evidence.

So, while I am happy to see that people are acknowledging what I have been pointing out for so many months, I am concerned that this is all short lived, before people go back to their comfortable state of denial.

Hopefully, if that happens, somebody in the cyber wilderness will have the patience to keep prodding people to think about what is behind Islamist words and the actions. I hope that it will not all fall back on Khalaf's shoulders.

I have no words

Hamas has sent Elaph and Reuters statements mourning the death of Zarqawi. According the statement to Reuters, Hamas announced that Zarqawi is "martyr of the (Muslim Arab) nation".

Elaph reports demonstrators in Gaza demanding revenge for Zarqawi.

What can I say? I'm disgusted.

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UPDATE
Three IAF deputies paid their condolences Friday to Zarqawi's family. Mohammad Abu Fares told his Friday congregation that Zarqawi was a mujahid (holy warrior).

UGH.

God protect us from extremism

According to a report in Al Rai today, IAF deputy Mohammad Abu Fares and a group of thugs accompanying him assaulted an imam in an Irbid mosque last Friday. The imam did his job by preventing Abu Fares from giving the Friday sermon. He was subsequently beaten up and insulted by Abu Fares' entourage.

Last January, Abu Fares denied fellow deputy Raed Hijjazin the right to criticize IAF actions because he is Christian. The IAF failed to apologize for that.

Meanwhile, the IAF head, Zaki Bani Ershaid warned that "continuation of repression of people's choices will lead to atmospheres where extremism can thrive replacing the moderate Islamic groups". Basically, he is threatening everybody that if his "moderate" party doesn't get what it wants, violence will ensue.

The failure of the IAF to rein in loose canons such as Abu Fares (who IS a member of the IAF) really doesn't bode well for their ability to restrain extremism. I essence, they don't seem to have neither the will nor the ability to prove themselves to be the force of moderation they claim they are.

Islamic banks and the financial blockade

Part of the rising tide of Islamism has led to the concept of Islamic banking. The basic need for "Islamic" banking arises from an injunction in the Holy Quran against usury. Under strict interpretations of Islam, bank interests are considered to be a form of usury. So, Islamic banks don't pay or charge interest.

One must not get the impression that Islamic banks are charitable organizations, because they are not. They make lots of money. How, I hear you asking, can a bank make money without charging interest? The answer is to rename interest and call it profit.

Say you want to buy a car, and you don't have the money and you want a halal loan. You go the Islamic bank and they will buy the car for you. Then they sell it to you at a higher price (making a profit on the car) and scheduling your loan over a specified period of time. Typically, the Islamic halal loan is about 25% more expensive than the bank that engages in usury…ooops, I meant charges interest. It is ironic that an injunction meant to protect people from exploitation is used to exploit people. I doubt that Allah would be impressed by this blatant interest laundering, but in the end it is up for Him to decide.

Getting money collected in favor of the Palestinian government to its final destination has been blocked by the refusal of commercial banks to transfer the money. The banks are afraid of the repercussions of angering the US and the EU. The US treasury department has threatened unspecified actions against financial institutions that deal with Hamas or the PA.

Yousef Qardawi has called on banks to break the blockade and suggested boycotting banks that refuse to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. A gathering to clerics in Qatar has also called on banks to break the boycott, warning that they "could launch a boycott asking Muslims to close their accounts and move them into Islamic banks".

Of course, the question arises whether Islamic banks are doing anything to transfer funds to the PA. If they did, then the problem wouldn't exist. So, clearly they are behaving the same way as all the other commercial banks.

It seems hypocritical that banks that are using religious cover to rip people off would ignore calls by Hamas and the religious scholars in Qatar. It is not that the US or the EU have the power to put them out of business. They can make things unpleasant and hurt their profits. But isn't the success of Hamas and the survival of the Palestinian cause worth the sacrifice?

Islamists are always challenging Jordan to behave against its interests under some vague ethos of sacrifice (more like masochism). Why don't they put their money where their mouth is?