Statement fallout

The communiqué issued following the meeting between the leadership of the Islamist movement and the prime minister seems to be causing tension in the movement. As I speculated in my post on the subject at the time, the content of the statement doesn’t seem to elicit a ringing endorsement in the Muslim Brotherhood. Press reports suggest that up to 18 of the 40 members of the MB consultative committee are intending to resign in protest over the statement.

The reason for the turmoil stems from what the protesters call capitulation of the leadership of the party with no commitment by the government to close unresolved issues of the jailed deputies and the ICCS. The state security court has announced that the three remaining jailed deputies will go on trial next Sunday. They have been moved from the remote Al Jafr prison to Qafqafa in the north, which is much more accessible. The main defendant, Mohammed Abu Fares, who is 77 years old, seems to be in poor health. He underwent heart catheterization yesterday, and was subsequently deemed healthy enough to go back to jail with his two colleagues. The ICCS has been entrusted to a temporary administrative committee until the prosecutor general decides whether to send the case to court or not.

So, the government has not changed it’s posture on the deputies and the ICCS. But I am interested in what has been called capitulation. Which of the seven points in the statement would be deemed to be controversial or would be considered backing down? Loyalty to the country? Placing Jordan’s interests first? Rejecting terrorism? Which exactly seems to require soul searching to be agreed to? Also, is the anger caused by the fact that the government has not changed it’s position, because not all of the members of the consultative committee were consulted or simply rejection of the content of the statement?

Some writers are wringing their hands over the possibility of a major split in the Islamist movement. Fahd Khitan is worried that such a spit could mean moving the more extreme elements of the movement into an even more radical direction. I would argue the opposite. By insisting that radicals such as Mohammad Abu Fares being considered within the mainstream, the establishment gives legitimacy to his views. This legitimacy allows for the propagation of extremism and even the mainstreaming of radicalism. Why would that be useful? In the final analysis, it is the Islamist movement that should make the decision as to whether they represent moderation or radicalism. The old game of putting a moderate veneer on a radical substance has been exposed.

But really, what do the radical elements of the MB really object to in the statement?